The quantum threat to Bitcoin: real risk or just another FUD?
The topic of quantum computers is often used as an argument against Bitcoin. Yes, the technology exists and yes, in theory it could create challenges. But the difference between “possible someday” and “a real threat today” is enormous.
Bitcoin relies on two main cryptographic mechanisms:
– ECDSA / Schnorr over secp256k1 for signing transactions
– SHA-256 for mining and address protection
Shor’s algorithm could theoretically compromise elliptic curve cryptography if the public key is exposed. Grover’s algorithm reduces the effective security of SHA-256 from 256 to 128 bits, but this still leaves brute-force attacks practically infeasible.
It is important to emphasize:
A quantum computer cannot change the 21 million BTC limit.
It cannot bypass proof-of-work.
It cannot “create” new coins.
How many BTC are actually at risk?
Only addresses where the public key is visible are vulnerable, mainly legacy P2PK. They hold around 1.6 million BTC, approximately 8% of the total supply.
However, the real potential market impact is much smaller. Only about 10,200 BTC are in structures that could create noticeable liquidity if suddenly compromised.
The rest are distributed across tens of thousands of separate UTXOs of roughly 50 BTC each, making mass theft an extremely slow process even under highly optimistic quantum advancement scenarios.
More modern formats like P2PKH and P2SH hide the public key behind a hash and remain protected until the funds are spent.
How far are we from real danger?
To break secp256k1 within a single day would require around 13 million physical qubits, roughly 100,000 times more than current capabilities.
Estimates place cryptographically relevant quantum computers at least 10 to 20 years away.
Long-term attacks would require years of computation.
Short-term attacks within minutes remain far in the future.
Should aggressive changes be made now?
Introducing untested quantum-resistant formats or extreme measures such as burning vulnerable coins carries serious risks:
– potential technical errors
– unnecessary changes to network rules
– interference with private property
– waste of time and resources
Bitcoin has already proven that it can adapt through upgrades. If necessary, post-quantum protection can be introduced via a soft fork without disrupting the network.
The quantum threat is theoretical, limited, and far from reality today.
This is not an emergency.
It is a topic for long-term planning.
Bitcoin was built to adapt. History shows that when a real need arises, the network finds a solution.
Calm comes from understanding. Not from panic.
And understanding comes from the right information and the right environment.
In a world where someone “predicts the end of Bitcoin” every week, access to real analysis is an advantage. That is why we created our Altcoins Telegram community – a place where we discuss topics like quantum computers, regulation, market cycles, and the real risks behind the headlines.
No unnecessary noise.
No FUD.
No sensationalism.
Only facts, context, and rational perspective.
Glossary
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
A cryptographic algorithm that allows Bitcoin transactions to be signed. It proves ownership of a private key without revealing it.
Schnorr
A newer digital signature scheme in Bitcoin that improves efficiency and security compared to ECDSA.
secp256k1
The specific elliptic curve used by ECDSA and Schnorr in Bitcoin.
SHA-256
A hash function used in mining and address generation. It converts information into a unique “fingerprint” that is practically impossible to reverse.
Shor’s algorithm
A quantum algorithm that could theoretically break elliptic curve cryptography if powered by a sufficiently strong quantum computer.
Grover’s algorithm
A quantum algorithm that reduces the security of hash functions by half (for example from 256 to 128 bits), but does not make them easy to break.
Brute-force attack
A method of “guessing” by trying all possible combinations until the correct one is found.
Proof-of-Work (PoW)
The mechanism through which Bitcoin validates blocks via computational work (mining).
P2PK (Pay-to-Public-Key)
An older type of Bitcoin address where the public key is directly visible. These are more vulnerable under a future quantum threat.
P2PKH (Pay-to-Public-Key-Hash)
A more modern format that hides the public key behind a hash until the funds are spent.
P2SH (Pay-to-Script-Hash)
An address format that enables more complex spending conditions and also hides the public key behind a hash.
UTXO (Unspent Transaction Output)
An unspent portion of a previous transaction. This is the actual “unit” the Bitcoin network operates with.
Soft fork
A protocol upgrade that introduces new rules without splitting the network in two.
Post-quantum protection
Cryptographic algorithms designed to be resistant to quantum computers.
FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt)
Fear, uncertainty, and doubt – a term used for negative and often exaggerated news intended to create panic.
